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We examine the retirement behavior of federal civil service workers.  This research 
contributes to the literature that more generally examines how retirement behavior 
responds to financial incentives.  The civil service workers in our study provide an 
interesting case study because they do not participate in the Social Security system, they 
are only covered by a defined benefit pension plan, and this pension plan is significantly 
different from the Social Security system in the structure of its incentives.  Moreover, 
there is widespread concern among policy makers of a pending retirement crisis in the 
federal civil service.  Relying on an option value framework, our main results suggest 
that federal civil service workers respond to their retirement incentives in a manner that is 
quite similar to the responses that others have found looking at much different retirement 
systems.  Such a result provides important additional evidence regarding the generality of 
previous results.  On the other hand, unlike previous studies, we find little evidence of a 
spike in the retirement rate at age 65, nor do we find much evidence of “excess 
retirements” or a large fraction of retirements at age 65 that are unexplained by our 
financial incentive model.  While past studies have attributed this age 65 effect to “social 
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The Retirement Behavior of Federal Civil Service Workers 
1. Introduction 
Because of the aging of the United States population and the trend towards early 
retirement, the relative size of the retired population is changing dramatically.  For 
example, 9 persons were paying into Social Security for every 1 person receiving benefits 
in 1955; this ratio declined to 3.4 to 1 in 2001 and is expected to decline to 2 to 1 by 2030 
(U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000).  This trend has important implications for the 
solvency of federal entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare, and 
potential legislative changes for these programs have been the subject of ongoing debate.  
A critical piece of information in assessing many changes to these entitlement programs 
and to pension systems more generally is the impact of financial incentives on retirement 
behavior. 
Numerous studies have examined the impact of financial incentives on retirement 
behavior over the last three decades.  These studies have focused on various aspects of 
the financial incentive and specified numerous behavior and empirical models to analyze 
their impact.  Although part of the differences across studies stems from the variation in 
incentives that people actually face, a large part also stems from the data that researchers 
have available.  Quite simply, the data requirements for computing social security wealth 
(e.g., long earnings histories and complicated benefit formulas) and pension wealth (e.g., 
varying and complicated formulas that often interact with social security wealth) are 
large, and simplifying assumptions are often necessary. 
In this paper, we contribute to this literature by examining the retirement behavior of 
a unique set of workers, the Department of Defense civil service workers who are  -  4  -  DRAFT 
 
covered by the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS).  One important reason to study 
the retirement behavior of these workers is that their financial incentives are relatively 
simple.  Civil service workers covered by CSRS do not participate in the Social Security 
system, and they are only covered by a defined benefit pension plan in which benefits are 
a function of years of service and highest salary.  This information is available in our data 
so that we can compute financial incentives much more precisely.  In addition, increasing 
evidence suggests that the individuals often know very little about their retirement 
incentives (e.g., Gustman and Steinmeier, 2001).  The plan simplicity would suggest that 
individuals are much more likely to know their incentives, and thus provides a “best 
case” in assessing retirement behavior. 
Another reason to study the retirement behavior of civil service workers is that the 
ages that are important in their retirement scheme are not coincident with the ages that 
are important to Social Security and Medicare.  Previous studies have concluded that 
their exists “excess retirement” at ages 62 and 65 because, after the incentives for Social 
Security and Medicare are accounted for, more people retire at these ages then the models 
would otherwise suggest.  This excess retirement is often interpreted as the impact of 
social norms.  We can examine our data for the existence of excess retirement, as well as 
at what ages it occurs, to shed further light on the findings from previous studies. 
A final reason for studying the retirement behavior of the CSRS-covered population 
is the widespread concern among policy makers of a pending retirement crisis in the 
federal civil service.  According to the President’s Management Agenda, approximately 
70 percent of the federal government’s current permanent employees will be eligible for 
early retirement by 2010 and they estimate that 40 percent of them are expected to retire  -  5  -  DRAFT 
 
(Office of Management and Budget, 2002).  The General Accounting Office placed this 
issue on the “high-risk list” of federal activities in 2001.  Moreover, numerous 
conferences and commissions have been convened to study the issue, including a high-
visibility commission chaired by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker.  
Despite this importance, only one prior study has explicitly analyzed federal civil service 
retirements (e.g., Smith and Sylwester, 1988); however, this study uses a retirement 
model that is not forward-looking, whereas significant subsequent research has pointed to 
the importance of forward looking models (e.g., Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise, 1992).  
Direct estimates of the retirement behavior of civil service workers can be used to inform 
policy decisions regarding these workers. 
Relying on an option value framework, our main result suggests that federal civil 
service workers respond to their retirement incentives in a manner that is similar to the 
response that other studies have found using data on much different retirement systems.  
Such a result provides important additional evidence regarding the generality of previous 
estimates.  On the other hand, we  find limited evidence of “excess retirement” at the key 
retirement ages of the civil service workers (55, 60, and 62).  Although past studies find 
spikes at key retirement ages, especially age 65, that are unexplained by financial 
incentives embedded in their models our models perform quite well and seem to capture 
well the financial incentives for individuals to retire.  Finally, we preliminarily find that 
our data do not support the estimation of a structural option value model.  Although this 
finding implies that we cannot estimate the parameters of an underlying utility function, it 
does provide further evidence that the reduced-form option value results are robust to a 
wide array of assumptions.   -  6  -  DRAFT 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  We first describe different forward-looking 
retirement models and review past empirical implementations of them.  Next, we describe 
the data we use and how we selected our sample.  We then provide some descriptive 
statistics about the federal civil service workers in our sample and present the results 
from estimating the different retirement models.  Lastly, we present our conclusions and 
directions for future research. 
2. Financial Incentives and Retirement Behavior 
The literature on retirement behavior is very large.
1  Researchers have relied on 
numerous types of empirical and behavioral models that vary tremendously with respect 
to complexity and data requirements.  In this paper, we focus on several models that can 
usefully be viewed as special cases of the so-called “option value model” of retirement.  
Option value models are forward-looking models in which individuals assess the value of 
retiring today versus remaining at work so that they have the option of retiring in the 
future.  These models stop short of specifying a full dynamic program that more 
completely specifies the uncertainty in the retirement decision (see Gotz and McCall, 
1987; Berkovec and Stern, 1991; Rust, 1989; Daula and Moffitt, 1995; French, 2001; 
Rust and Phelan, 1997).
2  However, dynamic programs often require other simplifications 
due to their complexity, and previous research suggests that these simplified models still 
perform quite well relative to more complicated models (see Lumdsaine, Stock, and 
Wise, 1992). 
                                                 
1 See Hurd (1990) and Leonesio (1996) for useful reviews.  See Samwick (1998), Coile (1999), Coile and 
Gruber (2000), Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) for more recent examples. 
2 Asch and Warner (1994) calibrate the parameter values for a dynamic program.  -  7  -  DRAFT 
 
2.1. The basic option value model 
We first describe the basic option value model, following the notation of Stock and 
Wise (1990).  Consider an individual who is currently working in year t.  Let  s Y  be 
earnings in year s if the individual is still working and  ) (r Bs  be retirement benefits in 
year s if the individual retires in year r.  Denote utility while working as  ) ( s W Y U  and 
utility while retired as  )) ( ( r B U s R .  Then, an individual’s value at time t of retiring in 
year r can be represented as, 
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where β  is the subjective discount rate and S is the year the individual dies.  
Furthermore, the individual’s expected gain from retiring in year r versus retiring today 
(year t) can be expressed as 
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where Et is the expectation at time t.   
The basic retirement decision is then characterized by whether there is a future year 
of retirement that returns an expected net gain to the individual.  If such a future year 
exists, the person is assumed to continue to work.  Formally, define r* to be the future 
year that maximizes the expected value of retiring ( t r r G r t r > ∀ = ), ( max arg * ).  Then, 
letting R be a random variable that equals one if the individual retires, the decision rule 
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Various sets of assumptions can then be made to empirically implement this decision 
rule. 
2.2. Empirical implementations of this approach 
We group the various sets of assumptions into three broad classes:  reduced-form 
option value models, financial models, and structural option value models.  We first 
present the reduced form option value model in order to make clear the interpretation of 
the financial models as restrictions on this model.  We then discuss the financial models 
and the structural option value models. 
2.2.1. Reduced-form option value (RFOV) models  
The RFOV empirical implementation assumes the values for the underlying structural 
parameters of the utility functions in equation 1.  The form of the utility function that is 
often used is the constant relative risk aversion, with a risk aversion parameter γ  and an 
additional parameter k to allow for differences in the value of income flows while 
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The RFOV assumes the values of these two parameters, as well as the subjective discount 
factor β .  Additionally, it is assumed that workers face age/gender-specific mortality 
risk that is independent of income; denote the probability of living to year s, conditional 
on being alive in year t, is  ) | ( t s π .  The maximum expected utility gain for remaining at 
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Finally, it is usually assumed that the worker and researcher know the value of future 
earnings and benefits, allowing the expectations in equation 5 to be ignored. 
With these assumptions, equation 5 can simply be computed for each individual.  We 
can then specify a standard dichotomous outcome model that is based on the decision rule 
in equation 3, 
(6)   *)]. ( Pr[ ] 1 Pr[ r bG a R t + = =  
Thus, the RFOV can be estimated as a probit or logit, and various other regressors can be 
entered. 
Such models were estimated in Stock and Wise (1990), Chan and Stevens (2001), 
Coile (1999), Coile and Gruber (2000), Samwick (1998), and Samwick and Wise (2001).  
These studies tend to assume utility function parameters that were estimated in structural 
option value studies such as Stock and Wise (1990), one of the few that actually 
estimated the utility function parameters.  They also tend to include a variable for social 
security and/or retirement wealth, intended to capture the wealth effect of retirement 
benefits and their positive effect on the demand for all goods, including leisure.  
2.2.2. Financial models 
A series of studies have implemented this basic approach by adopting a set of 
assumptions that are sufficient to reduce the retirement incentive to a simple financial 
incentive.  The first assumption is that the utility function is simply a revenue function by 
setting γ and k equal to one (see equation 4).  Setting γ equal to one is akin to assuming  -  10  -  DRAFT 
 
that the marginal utility of consumption is not decreasing, and setting k equal to one is 
akin to assuming that there is no disutility associated with work.   Second, these models 
assume that the discount factor is known, with a typical rate being 0.90.  Once again, 
these assumptions (in addition to the assumption that future earnings are known) are 
sufficient so that the value of continuing work can be computed directly, and the model 
reduces to a standard dichotomous outcome model (equation 6). 
Such financial models have been commonly used since the late 1970s to examine the 
retirement and retention behavior of military personnel (Warner, 1978; Warner and 
Goldberg, 1984; Smith, Sylwester, and Villa, 1991).  More recently, they have been used 
to model the retirement and separation behavior of federal civil service workers (Black, 
Moffitt, and Warner, 1990; Asch and Warner, 1999).  In such implementations, these 
models are referred to as Cost of Leaving (COL) models or, with an additional 
adjustment for the length of time over which the costs and benefits are realized, 
Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) models. 
More recently, Coile (1999) and Coile and Gruber (2001) use a similar financial 
model to examine the financial incentives of the social security system, referring to their 
model as a “peak value” (PV) model.  Coile and Gruber make several further simplifying 
assumptions in calculating their incentive variable.  Specifically, they ignore the 
incentive to work that stems from wages in their financial calculation.  Rather, they 
define a peak value incentive measure as the difference in expected pension wealth if 
someone retires at time r relative to retiring today, time t, appropriately discounted,  
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Like the option value model, the peak value model assumes that the individual retires at 
the r* that maximizes the value of retiring.  Coile and Gruber estimate a model of 
retirements as a function of the Social Security and pension peak value variables, and a 
variable representing the level of Social Security wealth.  The former variables capture 
the incentive effects of Social Security and pensions on retirement timing while the latter 
variable captures its wealth effect.    
2.2.3. Structural option value models 
Stock and Wise (1990) not only provided the first exposition of the structural option 
value (OV) model represented by equations 1 to 3, but they actually estimated the utility 
parameters as well.  To implement the model, the CRRA utility function is used once 
again, but now utility shocks are included, 
(8)  
s s s R
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Just as in the previous models, it is assumed that the econometrician knows precisely how 
individuals forecast future earnings.  Importantly, it is assumed that the utility shocks in a 
particularly period are observed before a person chooses to work or retire. 
To derive an estimable form of the structural OV model, equation 3 is rewritten as a 
standard probability statement, 
 (10)    ]. 0 *) ( Pr[ ] 1 Pr[ < = = r G R t   -  12  -  DRAFT 
 
The assumptions structurally build an error term into the model that can be interpreted as 
an unobserved utility shock.  If an individual is found to retire at an age that differs from 
her peak, it is assumed that this deviation was caused by a particular draw from the utility 
function.  
Structural OV models are estimated infrequently because they are more 
computationally difficult to implement.
3  First, the probability statement in equation 10 is 
a highly non-linear function of the underlying utility parameters.  Second, the optimal 
retirement date depends on the utility function parameters.  Thus, as one searches for new 
utility parameters, the optimal retirement needs to be re-evaluated.  Third, as more time 
periods are added, the model becomes dramatically more difficult to estimate because the 
structural error terms are correlated.  Stock and Wise (1990) estimate models based on a 
cross-section of individuals and on panel data for three periods, and Lumsdaine, Stock 
and Wise (1992) use cross-sectional data.  We discuss our estimation method and the 
assumptions we made to empirically implement the full OV model in Appendix A. 
2.3. Other relevant literature 
Many studies only focus on the financial incentives inherent in the Social Security 
system (see discussion in Stock and Wise, 1990).  However, Stock and Wise (1990) and 
Samwick (1998) find that pensions are empirically much more important than Social 
Security when computing the accrual of financial wealth over age.  This focus on social 
security is not surprising, given the immense amount of information necessary to 
calculate the incentives inherent in a pension scheme.  Pension schemes vary enormously 
across individuals and often have very complicated rules (see Kotlikoff and Wise, 1987).   -  13  -  DRAFT 
 
Moreover, approximately half of defined benefit pension holders are in plans where the 
benefits depend on social security (Slusher, 1998). 
In the process of developing option value models of retirement, Stock and Wise 
(1990) and Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1996) have noted that these models predict well 
the spikes in retirement rates at key ages, such as 55, 60, and 62.  However, they tend to 
significantly underpredict the spike in the retirement rate at age 65.  Only by including 
age dummies, an essentially ad-hoc approach, are they able to predict the spike at age 65.  
These papers find the high age-65 retirement is not explained by Medicare eligibility and 
attribute the age-65 excess retirement effect to social norms.   Because CSRS does not 
embed any financial incentive to specifically retire at age 65, and CSRS-covered 
employees are not covered by social security, the study of CSRS-covered federal 
employees offers a good opportunity to identify the presence of an age-65 effect.  
Another complication in the study of retirement incentives is that there is growing 
evidence that retirees do not have complete knowledge about their retirement plans.  
Using the Health and Retirement Study data, Gustman and Steinmeier (1999, 2001) find 
that many individuals are misinformed or lack information about their expected pension 
and Social Security benefits and about the features of the plans that cover them.  It is 
possible that individuals do not respond to the incentives inherent in a retirement system 
because they simply do not know or do not understand them.  However, the lack of 
information may itself reflect optimizing behavior.  Information is costly to obtain and 
individuals may be making appropriate investments in their level of information; 
similarly, individuals may have sufficient information to know not to retire, but not know 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 To our knowledge, the only examples of structural OV models is Stock and Wise (1990); Lumsdaine 
Stock and Wise (1992); and Ausink and Wise (1996).  -  14  -  DRAFT 
 
the characteristics that make this the right decision.  Regardless, CSRS personnel are 
likely to be among the better informed about retirement benefits because the plans are 
simple and because the benefits likely to provide the majority of retirement wealth.  
3. The Data 
In this section, we describe the structure of the CSRS retirement plan and the data that 
we use to analyze retirement behavior. 
3.1. The Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) 
Until 1987, the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) was the primary retirement 
system covering federal civil service personnel.  Because CSRS was legislated in the 
1920s before the Social Security system was created, civil service employees 
participating in CSRS are not covered by Social Security. In 1987, the Federal 
Employees Retirement System (FERS) was created; importantly, FERS includes Social 
Security coverage.  FERS covers federal civil service personnel hired for the first time 
after December 31, 1983 and those rehired with less than 5 years of service (YOS).  
Those re-hired after December 31, 1983 and who have more the 5 YOS are given the 
option to switch to FERS within 6 months of employment.  Those who do not switch to 
FERS are covered by a system called CSRS-interim (later called CSRS-Offset), which 
included both CSRS and Social Security coverage.  In 1987 and 1988, those under CSRS 
with more than 5 YOS were permitted to switch coverage and participate in FERS. 
Another opportunity to switch was given to them in 1998.  Participants of CSRS, CSRS-
offset, and FERS are also covered by Medicare. 
CSRS is a typical defined benefit retirement plan.  Benefits are vested after 5 years of 
service (YOS), and the benefit level is determined by the individual's highest 3 years of  -  15  -  DRAFT 
 
earnings and his or her YOS.  The normal retirement age is determined by ones’ years of 
service.  Individuals who reach age 55 with 30 YOS are entitled to receive full benefits, 
individuals who reach age 60 with 20 YOS are entitled to receive full benefits, and 
individuals who reach age 62 with 5 YOS are entitled to receive full benefits.   
Those who separate before they have become eligible to retire can claim benefits at 
age 62 if they have at least 5 years of service.  Their annuity is based on the highest three 
years of earnings at the time of separation.  Consequently, their pension annuity is eroded 
by inflation between the date of separation and age 62.  However, those who are eligible 
to retire get a pension annuity that is adjusted annually by the full CPI amount.  Thus, the 
benefit is essentially inflation protected for those who are retirement eligible at the time 
of separation.  This protection creates a strong incentive to stay in the civil service until 
retirement eligibility is reached as will be seen below when we show pension accruals 
and peak values under CSRS.  
The benefit formula under CSRS equals 1.5 percent of an individual’s highest three-
year average earnings times his or her years of service (YOS) for the first five YOS, plus 
1.75 percent of the highest-three average earnings times YOS for the next five YOS, plus 
2 percent of the highest-three average earnings times all YOS over 10.  The maximum 
annuity an individual can receive is 80 percent of the highest-three average earnings.  
Normally, this is acquired after 41 years of credible civilian and military service. 
3.2. The Department of Defense Civil Service (DoDCS) personnel data files 
We limit our analysis to permanent federal civil service personnel in the Department 
of Defense (DoD), covering fiscal years 1980 to 1996.  The data were provided by the 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and they represent administrative personnel  -  16  -  DRAFT 
 
records for the entire population of permanent workers in DoD during this time frame.  
DoD is the largest employer of federal civil service workers outside of the Post Office, 
employing an annual average of approximately 900,000 permanent workers over the 17 
years covered by our data.  The personnel record includes information on age, years of 
federal service, retirement system coverage, demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, 
race/ethnicity, reported handicaps), geographic location, educational level, pay plan (e.g., 
General or Work Schedule), pay grade and step, annual federal earnings, and other job 
characteristics including occupation and functional work area.  These data files contain 
individuals covered by CSRS, CSRS-Offset, and FERS. 
  Although past studies such as Stock and Wise (1990) have also used 
administrative personnel records to analyze retirement behavior, such data have several 
limitations.  First, the data exclude information on marital status, non-earned income, 
assets, health status, and other factors that may affect the retirement decision.  While we 
would prefer to have such information, we note that Samwick (1998) finds financial 
assets, marital status, and health status either to have a statistically insignificant effect or 
a small effect on retirement.  Second, we only observe individuals exiting from the civil 
service, not from the labor force.  Samwick (1998) compares his estimates in which exits 
are defined with respect to firms versus the labor force, and he finds that the latter 
definition provides an underestimate of the effect of financial incentives on retirement 
from the labor force.  Thus, our estimates will likely understate the effect of CSRS on 
labor force withdrawal.  However, for some purposes, the impact on firm exits is exactly 
the right concept.  For example, from the perspective of a firm influencing its workforce, 
they are exactly interested in the impact of incentives on leaving the firm.  -  17  -  DRAFT 
 
Offsetting these potential limitations are the advantages of using such administrative 
data.  First, the data include millions of records on individuals covered by a single 
retirement plan.  As discussed below, we take a one-in-ten random sample to reduce 
computational time, but we are still left with hundreds of thousands of observations.  The 
large number of records contrasts with the typical situation found in survey data, such as 
the HRS.  In those data, the sample sizes are often quite small, numbering in the 
hundreds, and the respondents are covered by a heterogeneous set of retirement plans, 
some of the features of which may be unknown to the researcher.   Second, information 
on years of service, a key component defining retirement eligibility and benefits, is 
provided by the employer and not based on the possibly inaccurate recollection of 
respondents.  Finally, we have extremely good information about retirement plan and 
changes over our data period. 
3.3. Selection of our sample and development of our analysis file 
Given our focus on retirement behavior, we restrict our data to civilian personnel in 
DoD who are between ages 50 and 70.  Consequently, we do not model the decision to 
separate before or stay until age 50.  We also limit our analysis to those covered by 
CSRS. 
Participation in CSRS, particularly in the later years of our data, i.e., in the 1990s, is 
not entirely exogenous.  As mentioned earlier, those who entered the civil service before 
1984 are automatically covered by CSRS.  However, individuals covered by CSRS and 
who had more than 5 years of service had the opportunity to switch to FERS during an 
“open season” that spanned from July 1987 to July 1988.  Thus, those covered by CSRS 
in the post-1988 part of our data include those who opted to stay under CSRS.   If the  -  18  -  DRAFT 
 
choice to to stay under CSRS or to switch to FERS is associated with characteristics that 
are also associated with the effect of retirement incentives on retirement behavior, our 
estimated effects of CSRS on retirement may be biased.  However, from a practical 
standpoint, such selection bias is unlikely to be a problem in our analysis because we 
limit our analysis to those with 15 or more years of service, as discussed below.  Earlier 
work suggests that the incentive to switch is very small for those with many years of 
service or who are older in age (Asch and Warner 1999).  Consequently, it is highly 
unlikely that there are many individuals in our data who had an incentive to switch to 
FERS.  We therefore ignore any selection problem that may arise by our focus on CSRS-
covered personnel. 
A key advantage of studying CSRS-covered is that personnel are not covered by 
Social Security by virtue of their federal service.  However, it is possible that these 
personnel held jobs in the past (or plan to hold jobs in the future) that were or will be 
covered by Social Security.  Insofar as these individuals accumulate sufficient number of 
quarters of social security coverage, their retirement behavior might be influenced by 
Social Security incentives.   
We made two data restrictions (in addition to limiting our analysis to those covered 
by CSRS) in an attempt to ensure that no one in our data has Social Security coverage.   
First, we exclude those with less than 15 years of service.  Individuals with fewer years of 
service are likely to have employment spells in covered jobs.   Thus, we excluded them.  
Second, we eliminated all personnel whose record suggests that they had served in one of 
the armed services prior to becoming a federal employee.  Since 1956, military personnel 
in the active and reserve components have been covered by social security.   About 20  -  19  -  DRAFT 
 
percent of new entrants to the DoD federal civil service have prior military service (Asch, 
2001).  We deleted these individuals because their retirement behavior might be 
influenced by social security coverage. 
A final selection criterion addresses a problem that has been documented earlier about 
the DoD civil service personnel data.  When the annual record for each individual is 
strung together over time, the years of service variable does not always increment in a 
sensible manner.  In some cases, years of services may actually decrease, or jump by 
more the one from year to year (Asch and Warner, 1999).  About 10 percent of the 
records had this problem in each year.   These records were deleted.  
In constructing our analysis file, we took into consideration several policy changes 
that occurred from 1982 to 1996.  The most important of them was the dramatic 
downsizing that occurred in DoD following the end of the cold war (beginning around 
1991) that resulted in a significant drop in the size of its civilian (and military) workforce 
(Asch and Warner, 1999).   Our reduced form regression models include fiscal year 
dummy variables to account for changes in the size of the federal workforce over our data 
period and we exclude individuals who retired under an “early out window”.
4  Another 
policy change of note is the Federal Employees Pay and Compensation Act (FEPCA) of 
1990.  FEPCA changed how the federal government adjusts the federal pay tables each 
year to reflect cost-of-living increases.  All federal employees get the same baseline 
annual pay change.  In addition, they get a change that depends on their specific 
geographic location.  The location specific pay change is intended to account for 
differences in the cost-of-living change across geographic areas.  These locality-specific  -  20  -  DRAFT 
 
pay adjustments began in 1994. Therefore, beginning in 1994, our annual pay variable 
also includes both the base adjustment and the locality adjustment. 
4. Who Are the Department of Defense Civil Service Workers? 
Although the Social Security Program is extremely large, coverage is not universal.  
The large number of federal employees under CSRS, together with many state and local 
government workers, and railroad workers, represent a large segment of workers who are 
not covered by Social Security.  Table 1 shows the extent of Social Security coverage in 
terms of wages and salaries.  In 1996, Social Security covered about 92 percent of the 
non-self-employed wages and salaries.   Although only about 8 percent of wages and 
salaries were uncovered, it represents about $300 Billion in 1996.   Federal employment 
wages and salaries represent a significant fraction of this uncovered amount. 
Table 2 reports means and standard deviations of the sample.  For a description of the 
means and standard deviations of all the explanatory variables used in the reduced form 
regression, see the Appendix.  We compare our sample of civil service workers to a 
sample of respondents from the first wave of the Health and Retirement Study.  From the 
HRS we select individuals 51-61 years old in 1992 and who are working fulltime.  Our 
CSRS sample has 33 percent higher earnings than the HRS sample.  They are also more 
likely to be a high school graduate and about equally likely to be a college graduate.  The 
CSRS sample is younger by about 2 years and is less likely to be male and white.   
CSRS embeds strong incentives to retire at its normal retirement ages.  This point can 
be observed in Table 3 where we show the mean, expected present discounted value 
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for now.  These individuals will provide an interesting test of the parameter estimates for future work (see 
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(PDV) of CSRS pension wealth for our sample.  The calculation assumes an annual 
earnings growth rate of 0.25 percent, a real interest rate of 3 percent, an inflation rate of 4 
percent.  The calculations are made for the first year in which we observe the workers in 
our sample, and we calculate the means separately for those who have a normal 
retirement age (NRA) of 55 and 60. 
For those with an NRA of 55, we find that the PDV of pension wealth more than 
doubles at age 55 as compared to age 54.  For those with an NRA of 60, pension wealth 
increases with age and then rises by over 35 percent at between ages 59 and 60.  Beyond 
age 55 in the first case and age 60 in the second, pension wealth declines with age as the 
effects of fewer years of pension receipt (given an assumed death age of 99) offsets the 
growth in earnings and the increase in years of service.  
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the CSRS pension peak value (see equation 
7) at each age.  The peak value captures the financial option value embedded in the CSRS 
pension system.  However, as noted above, it ignores earnings in the civil service, and the 
value of leisure and external opportunities.   The variation at each age reflects differences 
in years of service and earnings, the two other factors defining pension wealth at each age 
under CSRS.  As shown in Table 4, the mean value becomes negative at age 60. 
The peak values under CSRS in Table 4 are much higher at each age than the Social 
Security peak values reported by Coile and Gruber (2000, Table 4).  For example, at age 
55, the median pension peak value under CSRS is $81,109, about 4 times larger than 
21,260 reported by Coile and Gruber for Social Security.  At age 59, the figures are 
$48,344 and $13,714, respectively.  The mean peak value becomes negative at age 60  -  22  -  DRAFT 
 
under CSRS, but remains positive at $12,381 under Social Security.  As shown by Coile 
and Gruber, the pension peak value for Social Security becomes negative at age 65. 
Before presenting estimates of the effect of CSRS on retirement, it is interesting to 
consider the aggregate retirement hazards, shown in Figure 1.  Two points are worth 
noting.  First, the retirement hazards spike up at ages 55, 60, and 62, the three normal 
retirement ages embedded in the CSRS pension formula.   Second, we see a small spike 
at ages 64, an age that have no particular significance under CSRS, and no spike at age 
65.. 
5. Empirical Results 
In this section, we first present results from the financial and the reduced form option 
value models. We include variables intended to capture features of the worker's budget 
constraint including pension wealth, the financial incentive variables and earnings.  The 
pension wealth variable also captures the wealth effect of retirement benefits.  The 
financial incentive variables also capture the incentive to retire while the earnings 
variable captures the incentive to continue to work.  We also control for other factors 
related to retirement including disability, sex, education, occupation and age.  We then 
turn to preliminary estimates from the structural option value model. 
5.1. Financial and reduced-form option value model results 
Table 5 presents logistic regression model results.  The first specification follows 
Coile and Gruber (2000) and includes the CSRS pension peak value as the measure of the 
retirement incentives.  The peak value is denominated in dollars thus allowing for ease in 
interpretation.  The second specification presents the reduced-form option value model 
results in which utility function parameters are assumed.  Based on the original Stock and  -  23  -  DRAFT 
 
Wise (1990) study and the other papers that estimate this model, we set k to 1.5, γ to 0.75, 
and β to 0.95.  
Our results are consistent with earlier studies.  Using logistic regression we estimate a 
negative and statistically significant effect of the peak value and of the reduced form 
option value on the logit index function.  Our coefficient estimate for the peak value 
(measure in $10,000) is -0.023.  The estimate is the correct sign—an increase in the peak 
value associated with staying in the civil service reduces the probability of retirement—
and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  The coefficient implies that a 
$10,000 increase in peak values decreases the retirement rate by 0.0075 or 10% of the 
average retirement rate.  This translates into an elasticity of 0.10 --a one percent increase 
in peak value decreases retirement by 0.1 percent (see Table 3).   
Similarly, our estimate on the option value of retirement is negative and statistically 
different than zero at the 1 percent significance level (0.04).  The coefficient estimate in 
this model is not directly comparable to the one in the peak value model because it is 
expressed in utility rather than in dollar units.  To examine the economic content of the 
option value model, we use the parameters estimated from the option value model to 
simulate the effect on retirement of a decrease of 20 percent of retirement wealth.  The 
model predicts an average retirement rate that is 2 percent lower than what the retirement 
rate would be without the 20 percent decrease in wealth.  This represents a 35 percent 
decrease from the mean retirement rate.        
In a model incorporating Social Security and pension wealth, Coile and Gruber 
(2000) find that $1,000 in peak value lowers retirement by 0.5 percent of the sample 
average retirement rate.  Our estimate effect of peak value likewise leads to a slightly  -  24  -  DRAFT 
 
larger, 1 percent decrease of the average retirement rate for a $1,000 increase in peak 
value.  Samwick and Wise (2001) estimate that a $1,000 increase in their accrual measure 
(accrual to age 65) reduces baseline retirement probabilities by 1.8 percent.  Thus, our 
estimates are remarkable similar to estimates for workers covered by Social Security and 
pensions in the HRS as analyzed by other studies. 
The results for earnings are mixed.  As discussed earlier, the peak value measure does 
not include earnings, current or future, in its calculation.  In the model that includes the 
peak value incentive measure, earnings have the expected negative effect on retirement.  
In the option value model of retirement, however, compensation also has an independent 
effect on retirement although the effect is now positive.  We also include the log of 
pension wealth in the regression to account for a wealth effect of retirement independent 
of the incentive effect as measured by the peak value or option value.  The coefficient on 
log wealth in the peak value regressions implies a $10,000 increase in pension wealth 
increases retirement by 0.043 percentage points.  This is an increase in relative risk of 
retirement of 57 percent.  In the option value model, the effect is smaller and implies an 
increase in relative risk of retirement of 19 percent. 
Another way to assess model performance is to examine how well each model in 
Table 5 can predict actual retirement behavior but without relying on the underlying age 
patterns. In other words, we re-estimate the models presented in Table 5 (results not 
shown) not including the age dummy variables, and then predict retirement behavior.  As 
can be observed in Figure 2, the models without age do good job of tracking the increase 
in retirement at age 55 and age 60.  Moreover, the peak value and reduced-form option 
value models perform remarkably similarly.  Returning to the main models, we also  -  25  -  DRAFT 
 
include a full set of age dummies in both reduced form specifications (see Table 5).  
These dummies capture the effects of age on the retirement probit, over and above their 
effects through the retirement incentive variables.    Generally, we find statistically 
significant age dummy effects in both specifications and interpret this as 'excess 
retirements' -- retirements associated with age that are not explained by the incentive 
variables.  On the other hand, the magnitude of the age dummy effects are not large and 
while statistically different than age 55, the age dummies are generally not statistically 
different than the prior or following age.  For example, the largest age effect is at age 60, 
but even at that age, the change in the retirement rate implied by the coefficient estimate 
is only 9 percent.   Thus, we do not find the age 65 spike that previous studies have found 
(Lumsdaine, Stock, Wise 1996; Phelan and Rust, 1991, 1993; Stock and Wise 1990), nor 
do we have much evidence supporting the presence of excess retirements at 65 or at any 
other retirement age.  Civil service workers in our sample, who have at least 5 years of 
service have access to retiree health insurance upon separation from the job thus the 
availability of Medicare at age 65 is unlikely to cause an age 65 spike in retirement.  The 
lack of an effect at age 65 also suggests that there is no 'social norm' associated with 
retirement at age 65. 
We include several other covariates to capture characteristics of the job and the 
individual.  The regressions also include education, rating, pay scale, years of service, 
grade, occupation, race, disability, agency in the civil service, and fiscal year dummies.  
Many of the effects are statistically different than zero suggesting, as expected, that 
retirement is affected by characteristics other than financial incentives.  
  -  26  -  DRAFT 
 
5.2. Structural option value model results (PRELIMINARY) 
The primary difference between the RFOV and the structural OV model is that the 
RFOV assumes particular utility function parameter values, whereas the structural OV 
model estimates these parameters directly.  There are at least two motivations for 
estimating structural OV models.  First and foremost, the underlying utility function 
parameters are interesting in their own right.  Second, it is of interest to determine 
whether there might be better utility function parameters for the RFOV model than those 
currently used. 
There are fewer examples of structural OV models estimated in the literature, 
however.  One reason, as discussed previously, is that it is much more difficult to 
implement empirically.  A second reason seems to be that data do not always support its 
estimation.  For example, Samwick (1998) reports that his attempts at estimating a 
structural OV model were unsuccessful, and Ausink et al. estimate parameter values that 
theoretically are hard to believe.   
We also estimate a structural OV model.  We adopt assumptions that are very similar 
to Stock and Wise (1990) and Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1992), with specific details 
provided in the Appendix.  The main difference between our specification and these 
previous implementations is that we do not assume that the difference in error terms is 
mean zero, but rather has mean α .  The motivation for this change is that it structurally 
builds an intercept into the model.  When an intercept is included, the estimated 
parameters make a little more sense and the restriction that α  equals zero is rejected by 
the data.
5 
                                                 
5 We have estimated models with and without setting the intercept equal to zero.  We find that the 
estimation is much more numerically stable when the intercept is included and that we tend to get  -  27  -  DRAFT 
 
Rather than providing point estimates for the structural OV model, we instead map 
out much of the likelihood surface.  The motivation for this presentation of results is 
three-fold.  First, our data does not seem to support the model in that parameter estimates 
tend to converge to non-sensical values; examining the likelihood surface is a convenient 
method to demonstrate these results.  Second, because the model only has three structural 
parameters of interest (γ ,β , and k), it is possible to graphically examine the likelihood 
surface fairly easily; the other two structural parameters (σ  and α ) are primarily scaling 
parameters.  Third, the computational burden of mapping the likelihood surface is not 
appreciably more difficult than estimating the actual parameter values.
6  However, we 
still draw a simple one percent random sample of the individuals in our data to further 
reduce the computational burden; the resulting sample size of 6649 observations is still 
much larger than that used in many previous studies.   
To examine the likelihood surface of the structural OV model, we choose values for 
the three substantive parameters (γ ,β , and k) and then estimate the two scaling 
parameters (σ  and α ).  Fixing the three substantive parameters causes the structural OV 
model to reduce to a simple probit model in which the structural scaling parameters can 
be recovered from the simple probit parameters.  We repeat this estimation process for 
numerous values of the substantive parameters.  To examine the likelihood surface, we 
graph the quantity of negative 2 multiplied by the log-likelihood of these restricted 
                                                                                                                                                 
parameter values that are more sensible.  For example, we estimate rather reasonable estimates of the 
disutility of work (k) in the results presented below.  When the intercept is excluded, the estimated 
parameter value is less than 1. 
6 To understand this claim, consider equation A4.  The basic option value is much more complicated than a 
regular probit because the optimal retirement date r* must be re-evaluated as new parameter values are 
chosen to maximize the likelihood function and the likelihood function likely has kinks because the optimal 
retirement age is discrete and because many people face similar and pronounced retirement incentives.  
Thus, probit routines in standard statistical packages cannot directly be applied.  However, once the three  -  28  -  DRAFT 
 
models; because of this transformation, maximizing the likelihood of the structural OV 
model is equivalent to looking for the minimum of the surface that we graph.  We present 
two such graphs of the log-likelihood surface in Figures 3 and 4. 
Figure 3 presents the surface plotted with respect toβ and k, setting γ  equal to 0.6.  
As can be observed, the graph slopes towards a higher k and a lower β .  The likelihood 
surface becomes fairly flat in the direction of k after 2.0, but the surface is still strongly 
sloping towards a lower β  even at a value of 0.50.  Figure 4 examines the surface in the 
dimensions of γ and k, setting β  equal to 0.50.   After a value for k of 2.3, the likelihood 
surface is very flat in the dimension of k and γ ; there is slight slope towards a smaller γ .  
These basic conclusions regarding the shape of the surface are quite robust to focusing on 
other values of γ and β .   Moreover, these graphs also are indicative of the results when 
we estimate the five structural parameters jointly:  joint estimation tends to produce a 
value for β  that is very low compared to what would be expected when the estimation 
actually converges, and joint estimation will often not converge because it cannot find a 
unique value forγ and k. 
These structural OV results are still preliminary, so we refrain from speculating about 
their implications regarding the behavior of the DoD civil service workers and about the 
performance of the structural OV model.  However, it is interesting to note a couple other 
results from the literature.  First, Samwick (1998, p. 222) reports, “In my attempts to 
estimate the parameters of the option value model on the SCF sample, the parameters for 
the value of leisure in retirement…and the discount rate…could not be simultaneously 
                                                                                                                                                 
structural parameters are specified, then A4 reduces to a standard probit model (but with no intercept) with 
the coefficient interpreted as the inverse of σ.  -  29  -  DRAFT 
 
identified with any precision.”  Second, Samwick (2000) discusses several studies that 
have come to varying conclusions regarding the magnitude of the discount rate. 
More interestingly, these structural OV results suggest important directions for 
sensitivity analysis of the RFOV model.  Namely, by varying the utility function 
parameter values in the direction suggested by the structural OV results, we can examine 
how robust the RFOV model is to assumptions that fit the data better.
7  Specifically, we 
re-estimate the basic RFOV model, without age dummies, to predict retirement but use 
alternative utility parameters.  Figure 2 presents additional predictive results for two more 
RFOV models: RFOV-2 sets γ =0.1, k=2.0, and β =0.95 and RFOV-3 sets γ =0.6, k=2.8, 
and β =0.6. As can be observed, both of these additional models predict retirement very 
similarly to the PV model and the RFOV model with more realistic parameter values 
(RFOV-1).  These results suggest that the retirement elasticities are quite robust to 
alternative assumptions.   
6. Conclusions 
It is of immense interest to understand how retirement behavior responds to financial 
incentives, and numerous papers have focused on many different aspects of these 
incentives with many different models.  We contribute to this literature by examining the 
retirement behavior of federal civil service workers in the Department of Defense, the 
largest federal employer outside of the U.S. Postal Service.  These individuals provide an 
interesting case study because they do not participate in the Social Security system, they 
                                                 
7 In performing this sensitivity analysis, it is important to note that the RFOV model differs from the 
structural OV model in respect to a scaling factor that arises from the idiosyncratic part of utility (see 
equation A4).  The models would be more similar if the structural OV model assumed that the idiosyncratic 
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are only covered by a standard defined benefit pension plan, and this pension plan is 
significantly different in structure regarding retirement incentives.  Moreover, there is 
widespread concern among policy makers of a pending retirement crisis in the federal 
civil service. 
Relying on an option value or “forward-looking” framework, our main result suggests 
that federal civil service workers respond to their retirement incentives in a manner that is 
quite similar to the response other studies have found, using data on much different 
retirement systems.  For example, we obtain an elasticity of 0.1 in the peak value model 
where Coile and Gruber (2000) estimate a .05 elasticity and Samwick and Wise (2001) 
estimate a .18 elasticity.  Such a result is surprising given the much different nature of the 
pension schemes.   Moreover, the similarity of elasticities provides important evidence 
regarding the generality of previous estimates.   
In addition, we find little evidence of “excess retirement” at the key retirement ages 
of the civil service workers (55, 60, and 62).  Thus, our results suggest that the option 
value model does a good job of capturing the incentives for individuals to retire.   In 
contrast, past studies find that option value models under-predict retirement rates at key 
ages, particularly age 65, without the inclusion of age dummies in the model. Previous 
research has ruled out Medicare eligibility as an explanation and has speculated that 
“excess retirement” could be due to social norms.  High age-65 retirement due to 
Medicare eligibility is unexpected in the population of civil service workers because 
these workers have access to retiree health insurance.  Since civil service workers are 
                                                                                                                                                 
results in very high values of β  rather than very low values.  This empirical finding is consistent with 
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members of the larger U.S. labor market, it is not obvious why they would not be subject 
to same social norms.  
Finally, we preliminarily find that our data do not support the estimation of a 
structural option value model.  Although this finding does not allow us to estimate the 
structural parameters of a utility function, this finding does provide further evidence that 




  -  32  -  DRAFT 
 
Appendix 
We provide further details about the data and the structural option value estimation 
methods in the appendix. 
Data.  In Table A1, we provide basic descriptive statistics for other variables used in 
our analysis.  Short descriptions of the variables are provided whenever the variables are 
not self-explanatory. 
A few variables deserve special note. 
 
Estimating a structural option value model.  Our implementation of the OV model 
follows Stock and Wise (1990) very closely; throughout the appendix, we will simply 
refer to the paper as SW.  Again, the error terms are structurally built into the model by 
appending unobserved (to the econometrician), idiosyncratic shocks to the CRRA utility 
functions (see equation 8), and then the decision rule to retire can be characterized by a 
probability statement (see equation 10).  To develop an estimable model, it is useful to 
first rewrite the probability statement by substituting (8) and (1) into (2), 
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where ) (r gt  is the first three terms and  ) (r t φ is the last term.   -  33  -  DRAFT 
 
We now make various assumptions to empirically implement the model.  The first 
assumption is that individuals evaluate the future until age 99 and the probability of 
living until year s at time t, ) | ( t s π , is independent of earnings.  With such an 
assumption, the quantities ) (r gt  and  ) (r t φ  simplify to 
(A2) 
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The second assumption allows us to evaluate the expectation of future earnings and 
retirement benefits.  SW approximates 
γ
s tY E  using a second order Taylor expansion and 
approximates
γ )) ( ( r kB E s t  with the approximation 
γ )) ( ˆ ( r B k s .  We choose to evaluate 
both expectations using SW’s latter method of approximation.  Thus, we instead 
approximate 
γ
s tY E  with 
γ
s Y ˆ .  These approximations are akin to assuming that the workers 
forecast their future earnings and benefits without error.  Such an assumption is more 
reasonable for the workers in the civil service than it would be for the general population, 
given the strict pay grades that exist. 
The key assumption regarding how difficult the model is to estimate rests with 
assumptions on the error terms in the utility function ( s s ξ ω , ), which in turn gives the 
structure for the expression  ) (r t φ .  Like SW, we assume that the error terms are Gaussian 
Markov with a zero mean.  This assumption results in a composite error term  s ν  that is 
also Gaussian Markov with a zero mean.  Under this assumption, the expression  ) (r t φ  






















The probability of retiring is then simply 
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where [.] Φ  is the cumulative normal distribution function. 
Two additional but related assumptions remain.  The first rests with whether one 
should use cross-sectional or panel data.  As panel data is used, the evaluation of 
probability statement (A4) becomes much more difficult because it is a multinomial 
discrete choice problem in which higher-dimensional integrals must be evaluated.  SW 
estimates both cross-sectional and panel versions.  However, their panel version only 
includes three years of panel data, and Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992) conclude that 
the cross-sectional version is sufficient.  The second is that observed retirement in year t 
depends on a worker not retiring previously.  SW concludes that this problem is 
intractable and ignores it.  However, this implies that their sample is necessarily weighted 
towards individuals who chose to delay retirement. 
In our structural OV estimation, we take somewhat of a middle ground.  First, we rely 
on the cross-sectional model but we use the panel data.  This method has the benefit that 
it corresponds more closely to the implementation of the RFOV and PV models and that 
it weights the sample more appropriately towards actually retirement behavior.  However, 
the method has the drawback that it ignores that the same individuals are observed 
repeatedly in the data, and thus does not take adhere exactly to the Markov assumption.  -  35  -  DRAFT 
 
 Table A1:  Mean and Standard Deviation of Other Variables 
Mean Std.  Deviation 
Annual earnings  44538  17986 
Ln(PDV pension)  12.0262  0.8184 
Pay grade:  9.2311  3.3840 
Performance rating: used in promotion, scale 
1=outstanding, 5=unsatisfactory 
1.4996 1.0660 
No rating:  no performance rating provided  0.1227  0.3281 
Years of federal service  26.6151  5.8266 
Pay Plan-General Schedule:  0.7121  0.4535 
Pay Plan-WC:  Corps of Engineers  0.0007  0.0271 
Pay Plan-WG:  Wage Grade, non-supervisory  0.1054  0.3071 
Pay Plan-WS:  Wage grade, supervisory  0.0235  0.1516 
Pay Plan-WL:  Wage grade, Leader  0.0079  0.0887 
Male 0.4051  0.4909 
Occupation-Blue collar  0.1497  0.3567 
Occupation-Professional 0.1744  0.3794 
Occupation-Administrative 0.3118  0.4632 
Occupation-Technical 0.1639  0.3701 
Occupation-Clerical 0.1990  0.3992 
Has a disability:  0.1511  0.3581 
Education-Less than High school  0.0877  0.2828 
Education-Some college  0.2520  0.4342 
Education-College 0.1031  0.3041 
Education-Graduate degree  0.1211  0.3262 
Race-White 0.7441  0.4362 
Race-Black 0.1529  0.3598 
Race-Hispanic 0.0502  0.2183 
Race-Other 0.0529  0.2239 
Agency-Army 0.3491  0.4770 
Agency-Navy 0.2686  0.4432 
Agency-Marine 0.0188  0.1357 
Agency-Airforce 0.2524  0.4344 
Agency-Other 0.1111  0.3143 
Note:  This table provides descriptive statistics for the other variables we use in our analysis.  Number of 
observations is 636,331.  -  36  -  DRAFT 
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Table 1:  Wage and Salary Coverage by Major Public Retirement Programs 
[Billions]  













1981 1,510  1,445  13  56  135 
1986 2,095  1,896  12  72  190 
1991 2,828  2,565  12  92  271 
1996 3,632  3,328  13  107  365 
Note:  These data were taken from the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, 1999, 
Table 3.B2, p. 141.  The categories in the last four columns are not mutually exclusive.  Starting in 1984, 
for example, some federal civil servants could elect to be part of the Social Security system. Wages that are 




Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics for Primary CSRS Sample and HRS Sample 
  CSRS (N=87,867)  HRS (N=) 
  Mean  Std. dev.  Mean  Std. dev.
Annual wages and salaries (2000$)  42,252  16,849  33,612  35,583
Pension coverage  1  --  0.759  0.438
Birth year  1935.3  3.8   
Less than high school degree  0.092 0.290  0.234  0.439
High school  0.420  0.494  0.322  0.466
Some college  0.249  0.433  0.214  0.407
College degree  0.096  0.294  0.230  0.408
Male 0.424  0.494  0.597  0.498
White 0.750  0.433  0.875  0.392
Black 0.150  0.357   
Hispanic 0.051  0.219   
Note:  The primary sample is selected from the CSRS-covered civil service workers in the 
Department of Defense, 1982-1996, with age and other restrictions as described in the text.  The 
HRS sample is full-time workers from the 1992 survey wave between the ages of 51 and 61. . 
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Table 3:  Mean Prospective Pension Wealth by Normal Retirement Age 
 
Retirement Age 
Normal Age of 55 
 (N=38,546) 
Normal Age of 60 
(N=31,248) 
50 140,993  66,297 
51 151,241  71,017 
52 162,721  76,546 
53 175,622  84,562 
54 189,326  93,121 
55 427,838  102,257 
56 416,143  112,002 
57 403,758  122,391 
58 390,750  133,463 
59 377,148  145,255 
60 362,817  195,833 
61 347,390  190,865 
62 330,783  185,385 
63 313,212  179,444 
64 294,808  173,093 
65 256,856  155,392 
66 243,315  149,508 
Note:  This table is based on the first year we observe everyone in our primary sample.  
We compute their expected PDV pension wealth for retiring at each age.  We make the 
following assumptions:  earningsgrowth=0.25%, real interest=3%, and inflation=4%.  
All dollar values are in 2000$.  See text for additional details. 
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50 68,727  226,094  105,520 108,757  202,518  379,531 
51 75,080  219,927  106,210 103,632  195,394  374,473 
52 81,340  213,187  106,943  98,263  187,846  369,210 
53 76,864  212,042  107,592  96,531  186,160  369,543 
54 72,612  208,646  107,763  93,089  182,406  365,878 
55 67,291  75,281  92,192  -19,274  83,343  196,194 
56 53,860  68,505  82,342  -20,492  78,820  174,168 
57 40,768  59,596  72,097  -21,625  71,422  150,518 
58 31,120  48,287  61,929  -22,552  60,970  126,772 
59 23,244  36,407  52,049  -23,494  48,886  102,196 
60 16,960  -12,021  8,905  -24,740  -9,093  -3,925 
61 10,897  -13,351  9,513  -26,984  -10,244  -4,778 
62 6,991  -14,559  10,027  -28,890  -11,297  -5,590 
63 4,224  -15,901  10,720  -30,915  -12,449  -6,326 
64 2,573  -17,619  11,828  -33,845  -13,742  -7,070 
65 1,436  -19,542  12,699  -36,951  -15,215  -7,940 
Note:  This table presents the descriptive statistics for every person-year in our primary sample.  See notes 
for Table 3 and the text for further details. 
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Table 5a: Retirement Logits for Financial and Reduced Form Models 
 Peak  Option  Value  
Parameter  Estimate Std.  Error  Estimate Std.  Error 
Intercept -13.3066 0.4338 -6.9169 0.3567 
Financial Incentive   
Peak value (x1000)  -0.0023 0.0001  
Option value (x1000)  -0.0400 0.0012 
Annual earnings (x1000)  -0.0300 0.0032 0.0130 0.0033 
 earnings squared ( x10-8)  0.0133 0.0021 -0.0073 0.0021 
Ln(PDV Pension wealth)  0.9446 0.0442 0.3160 0.0339 
Age 50  -1.0186 0.0448 -0.8985 0.0436 
Age 51  -0.8836 0.0391 -0.7792 0.0382 
Age 52  -0.6771 0.0328 -0.5916 0.0321 
Age 53  -0.6081 0.0297 -0.5433 0.0292 
Age 54  -0.4325 0.0266 -0.3956 0.0262 
Age 55 (omitted)  -- -- -- -- 
Age 56  -0.2001 0.0181 -0.2253 0.0181 
Age 57  -0.3249 0.0199 -0.3758 0.0200 
Age 58  -0.3544 0.0215 -0.4319 0.0217 
Age 59  -0.4201 0.0238 -0.5274 0.0240 
Age 60  0.0967 0.0238 -0.0315 0.0242 
Age 61  -0.0758 0.0287 -0.2339 0.0292 
Age 62  -0.0099 0.0340 -0.1977 0.0344 
Age 63  -0.1904 0.0435 -0.4072 0.0438 
Age 64  -0.2100 0.0522 -0.4533 0.0523 
Age 65  -0.1901 0.0728 -0.4624 0.0727 
Age 66  -0.1551 0.1037 -0.4462 0.1034 
Age 67  -0.2154 0.1920 -0.5283 0.1913 
Age 68  -0.8507 558.20 -1.2041 571.50 
Age 69  -0.1024 6739.60 -0.3617 6739.60 
Note:  These regressions are based on the primary sample.  The reduced form option value 
model assumes the following parameters: γ =0.75, k=1.5, and β =0.95.  See the notes for 
Table 3 and the text for additional details.  Regressions also include fiscal year dummies. 
Number of observations is 636,331 
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Table 5b: (Continued) Retirement Logits for Financial and Reduced Form Models 
Parameter  Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
Grade 0.0251 0.0100 0.1260 0.0101 
Performance rating  0.1245 0.0069 0.1255 0.0069 
No performance rating  0.3834 0.0228 0.3823 0.0228 
Years of service  0.0449 0.0043 0.0684 0.0035 
Grade*Years of service  -0.0009 0.0003 -0.0043 0.0003 
Pay plans   
WC 0.3537 0.1961 0.3477 0.2017 
WG -0.0344 0.0472 -0.0219 0.0472 
WS 0.0387 0.0531 0.0580 0.0533 
WL -0.1149 0.0693 -0.0927 0.0693 
Male -0.0266 0.0170 -0.2047 0.0171 
Occupation  
Blue collar  -0.3999 0.1310 -0.4318 0.1314 
Professional -1.0290 0.1262 -1.0695 0.1265 
Administrative -0.8516 0.1248 -0.8791 0.1252 
Technical -0.8702 0.1244 -0.8877 0.1247 
Clerical -0.9908 0.1245 -1.0155 0.1248 
Has a disability  0.1745 0.0138 0.1756 0.0138 
Education  
Less than High school  0.0150 0.0195 0.0187 0.0194 
High school (omitted)  -- -- -- -- 
Some college  -0.1463 0.0131 -0.1489 0.0131 
College -0.3260 0.0237 -0.3399 0.0239 
Graduate degree  -0.6018 0.0272 -0.6086 0.0273 
Black -0.1459 0.0150 -0.1445 0.0150 
Hispanic -0.1608 0.0238 -0.1584 0.0237 
Other -0.3937 0.0249 -0.3895 0.0249 
White (omitted)  -- -- -- -- 
Agency  
Army (omitted)  -- -- -- -- 
Navy -0.0200 0.0139 -0.0221 0.0139 
Marine -0.2984 0.0408 -0.2928 0.0408 
Airforce 0.0013 0.0146 0.0031 0.0146 
Other 0.0667 0.0172 0.0702 0.0172 
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Note:  This figure presents the probability of retiring by age in the primary CSRS sample. 
 










Note:  This figure presents the probability of retiring by age in the primary CSRS sample (Actual) 
and the predicted probability of retiring in four different models.  The four models used for 
prediction do not include age dummies in the regression.  RFOV-1 sets γ =0.75, k=1.5, and β 
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Note:  This figure presents the log-likelihood surface (multiplied by –2) for a structural OV model, holding 
gamma, kappa, and beta fixed and estimating the two scaling parameters (the intercept and the variance).  
See the text for further details. 
 











Note:  This figure presents the log-likelihood surface (multiplied by –2) for a structural OV model, holding 
gamma, kappa, and beta fixed and estimating the two scaling parameters (the intercept and the variance).  
See the text for further details. 
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